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Coast Hotel v. Parrish
by John Ryskamp
We are naturally led to the conclusion that the Ninth Circuit’s recent decision in
Guru Nanak v. Sutter1 is a simple misreading of Oregon v. Smith,2 just as RLUIPA—
which the Ninth Circuit just upheld—misused Smith. But something odd is going on
when neither counsel nor Court argues this. What it means is that there such a consensus
that the scrutiny regime still operates, that there is no need to discuss it, and no one ever
thinks about it. That is a serious mistake. RLUIPA challenges the foundation of the
scrutiny regime, and the Supreme Court has done so as well. This suggests that those
who would defend the scrutiny regime, either need to start arguing it explicitly, or join in
its abandonment and start arguing the facts. Counsel opposing RLUIPA in Nanak
certainly do not realize what is going on. They did not even argue that RLUIPA involved
a misuse of Smith. And in a companion Ninth Circuit RLUIPA case, Christian Center v.
Elsinore, there has been a persistent failure of those who would defend the scrutiny
regime, to either argue in its defense, or to argue under the new Constitutional regime the
Supreme Court has inaugurated.
Nanak revolves around this section of RLUIPA, which elevates, to strict scrutiny,
the level of scrutiny for exercise of religion in the following circumstance: a “substantial
burden is imposed in the implementation of a land use regulation or system of land use
regulations, under which a government makes, or has in place formal or informal
procedures or practices that permit the government to make, individualized assessments
of the proposed uses for the property involved.” And here is the crucial passage from the
Nanak decision: “We decide that the County made an individualized assessment of Guru
Nanak’s [application for a zoning permit to build a church], thereby making RLUIPA
applicable, and that the County’s denial of Guru Nanak’s application constituted a
substantial burden, as that phrase is defined by RLUIPA. Because RLUIPA applies to
this case, we address RLUIPA’s constitutionality pursuant to Section Five of the
Fourteenth Amendment, and decide that RLUIPA is a congruent and proportional
exercise of congressional power pursuant to the Fourteenth Amendment.”3
This is a flagrant misconstruction of Oregon v. Smith. What counsel opposing
RLUIPA did not point out is that the use of “individualized assessments” in RLUIPA,
assumes—or rather, presumes—that health and welfare regulation affecting an exercise
of religion is a policy of affecting an exercise of religion. That is not Smith. Smith stood
for exactly the opposite proposition, although the authors of RLUIPA used the terms
from Smith in the legislation.
The irony of Nanak is that in the using the Smith decision to uphold RLUIPA,
Smith was defeated in his claim that he was wrongly denied unemployment
compensation when he was dismissed for using peyote for religious purposes. When the
Smith Court discussed an “individualized governmental assessment,” it was referring to
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“a system of individual exemptions”4 as a policy, not an effect. When there was such a
system, then strict scrutiny applied when it substantially burdened an exercise of religion.
The Court did not mean that the operation of health and welfare regulations was
inherently a “system of individual exemptions” and that all effects of the policy were to
be subject to strict scrutiny with respect to an exercise of religion. In short,
“assessments” are not synonymous with “exemptions.” Indeed, there was no evidence in
Nanak that Sutter had turned its zoning policy into an effect in order to bar the new
church. Even the church did not contend this, but the Ninth Circuit blithely assumed it.
“Individualized assessment” was conflated with “substantial burden.”
In finding RLUIPA unconstitutional, the District Court had claimed in Elsinore
that the fault with the Christian Center’s RLUIPA argument was that “[i]n determining
whether to issue a zoning permit, municipal authorities do not decide whether to exempt a
proposed user from an applicable law, but rather whether the general law applies to the
facts before it.”5 That’s not bad, but it misses the point. The point is that RLUIPA
conflates “exempt” and “apply.” This is what the Court missed, and it did so because it
could not believe that anyone was challenging the scrutiny regime of West Coast Hotel v.
Parrish. Indeed, the District Court found RLUIPA unconstitutional on the grounds that
only the Court can say what, in fact, freedom of religion is—a Marbury argument which
is quite beside the point unless the Court has West Coast Hotel clearly in view, which the
Elsinore Court did not. The Court was unconsciously acknowledging that RLUIPA
infringes on the scrutiny regime, which of course it does, but that is as far as the Court
could bring itself to go. If Nanak goes up to the Supreme Court on appeal, the question
should be, Does RLUIPA overrule West Coast Hotel v. Parrish? What would you care to
bet that counsel will be too stupid to phrase the question in this way?
Regardless of how the question is phrased, RLUIPA should be seen in the context
of yet another case. West Coast Hotel v. Parrish6 established the scrutiny regime, one of
the corollaries of which is that an exercise of religion does not enjoy a higher level of
scrutiny than minimum scrutiny with respect to laws of general applicability. But are we
still living in that era? Lawrence v. Texas, in which the Court held sodomy laws
unconstitutional “furthers no legitimate state interest.”7 Obviously, this is not a test on
the scrutiny regime. Minimum scrutiny says that laws are constitutional if they are
rationally related to a legitimate state interest. Intermediate scrutiny says that laws are
unconstitutional if they substantially further an important state interest. The Lawrence
test takes one term from each test. It makes no sense as a scrutiny regime test, and it is
not one.
What the Court is doing is drawing from its unofficial jurisprudence, in which it
decides which facts it considers important and wishes to see the law maintain. Laws
which maintain important facts are found constitutional, and this unofficial determination
is made official through its expression in terms of scrutiny regime. That is how the Court
operates. Lawrence simply makes it clear that that is how the Court has always operated.
The Court now feels that liberty is more important than the scrutiny regime allows, so it
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breaks the scrutiny regime to give more individually enforceable rights with respect to
liberty. In Lawrence it does so explicitly. Commentators wonder why the Court didn’t
simply hold that there was no rational basis for sodomy laws. Why didn’t the Court do
what it could easily have done—keep its reasoning within the scrutiny regime? Because
the Court doesn’t like the scrutiny regime.
The RLUIPA question is going to be addressed in the context of a simple dislike
of the scrutiny regime and an informal analysis of facts of importance to the Court.
Therefore it is important to argue the FACTS. The scrutiny regime very conveniently
allowed us to avoid the question, what in fact is an exercise of religion? particulary with
respect to the “laws of general applicability” test. But that is over now, and advocates of
RLUIPA can easily analogize freedom of religion to liberty. If health and welfare
regulation has to maintain liberty, does it not also have to maintain freedom of religion?
On the other hand, the Christian Center did not argue in Elsinore that where an exercise
of religion is exercised, is an indicium of an exercise of religion. Nor did Guru Nanak
argue that where individuals want to exercise religion, is an indicium of an exercise of
religion. Is the “free” in “free exercise” of religion, the way the Founders say liberty is
an indicium of the protected exercise of religion? Opponents of RLUIPA may wish to
argue that that desire is not an indicium of the free exercise of religion, or if it is, that
health and welfare regulation does not have a substantial impact on a desire. Or, if it
wishes to use the informal maintenance jurisprudence of Lawrence, it may argue that
government is not obliged to maintain freedom of religion to extent of accommodating
desires.
Whatever the doctrines, we are now clearly in a Constitutional era in which
lawyers have to argue what, in FACT, are such things as freedom of religion and liberty.
Although Congress has clearly presumed discretion over what in FACT is freedom of
religion in RLUIPA, we have left behind the era in which factual inquiries are left to the
political system. Marci Hamilton, author of God and the Gavel and a strenuous opponent
of RLUIPA and supporter of the scrutiny regime, fulminated against Guru Nanak in an
email to me: “[R]eligious conduct is going to receive more protection than speech, which
is perverse, to say the least. Speech does not receive ‘strict scrutiny’ in circumstances
where there is individualized assessment unless there are no procedural safeguards. The
land use schemes always have such safeguards built in.” This is an historically
significant comment because it reflects common reactions of defenders of the scrutiny
regime: a denial that what is happening, is happening, and a total unwillingness to
grapple with the change.
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